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Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments:  
A Mirror on the History of the Foundations of Modern Criminal Law 
 
Bernard E. Harcourt1  
 
 
 
‘In order that punishment should not be an act of violence perpetrated by 
one or many upon a private citizen, it is essential that it should be public, 
speedy, necessary, the minimum possible in the given circumstances, 
proportionate to the crime, and determined by the law.’2   
 
With these words, penned when he was only 25 years old, Beccaria closed Dei delitti e 
delle pene, a concise treatise that would become the crown jewel of the Italian 
Enlightenment and a classic text of modern penality. An impassioned critique of the 
punishment practices of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which Beccaria 
perceived to be excessive, brutal, arbitrary, and unequal, On Crimes and Punishments is a 
manifesto for legal reform centered on the Enlightenment values of rationality, 
proportionality, legality, lenience, and the rule of law. It offers a passionate plea against 
the use of judicial torture to extract confessions, as well as to exonerate guilt, against the 
use of secret evidence and sealed accusations, against sentencing inequalities based on 
wealth and social status, and against excessively brutal corporal punishments. The 
treatise was one of the first and became one of the leading tracts against capital 
punishment. It calls for reform toward the rule of law, principles of legality and fair 
notice, as well as more proportional, swift and certain punishments, drawing both on the 
tradition of the Philosophes of the Encyclopédie and on utilitarian notions—thus 
synthesizing deontological Enlightenment principles with core utilitarian insights.    
 
 Beccaria’s treatise was hugely influential on Blackstone and Bentham, and on the 
early development of utilitarian thought in penal justice, as well as on later developments 
during the twentieth century in the economic analysis of crime and punishment. 
Beccaria’s theory and arguments were the target of pointed critiques by Kant and Hegel. 
The work also forms the keystone to Foucault’s genealogy of the prison in Discipline and 
Punish: Beccaria’s treatise captured perfectly, in Foucault’s words, that ‘new strategy for 
the exercise of the power to punish’3 at the heart of the eighteenth century reform 
movement: ‘to make of the punishment and repression of illegalities a regular function, 
coextensive with society; not to punish less, but to punish better; to punish with an 
attenuated severity perhaps, but in order to punish with more universality and necessity; 
1 Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Chicago. Special thanks to 
Alessandro Fontana, Guyora Binder, Alan Brudner, Markus Dubber, Klaus Günther, Simon Stern, and 
Mariana Valverde for comments on this essay. Portions of the essay are drawn from B Harcourt, The 
Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (2011).  
2 C Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, R Bellamy (ed) (1995) 113. 
3 M Foucault, Discipline and Punish, A Sheridan (trans) (1979) 81-82. 
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to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body.’4 On Crimes and 
Punishments symbolized, for Foucault, a turning point that would ultimately lead to the 
birth of discipline, of the prison and, more generally, of the carceral sphere.  
 
Over the centuries, Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments has become a 
placeholder for the classical school of thought in criminology and deterrence-based 
public policy, for death penalty abolitionism, as well as for liberal ideals of legality and 
the rule of law. As Richard Bellamy suggests, Beccaria’s eighteenth century treatise has 
entered that ‘category of works which are much cited and little read.’5 But it is precisely 
in the diversity of citations—in the wide-range of receptions and appropriations, positive 
and negative—that we can read afresh, with new eyes, this foundational text in criminal 
law theory. An object of praise among utilitarians, a source of inspiration for classical 
English jurists, a target of pointed critiques by retributivists, the subject of histories and 
genealogies, the object of derision by the first économistes, rehabilitated and appropriated 
by the Chicago School—these ricochets and reflections on Beccaria’s treatise are 
precisely what reveal and allow us to fully appreciate the multiple and rich intellectual 
dimensions of On Crimes and Punishments and to outline a history of the foundations of 
modern criminal law.  
 
I. Early reception by the Philosophes  
 
The young aristocrat, Cesare Beccaria Bonesana, Marquis of Gualdrasco and Villareggio6 
(1734-1794), wrote the manuscript that would become Dei delitti e delle pene between 
March 1763 and January 1764 while an active member of a small Milanese intellectual 
circle known as the “Accademia dei pugni,” or the “Academy of fisticuffs”—so named, 
reputedly, because so many of their discussions and debates ended in fist fights. The 
academy, self-consciously modeled after the circle of the Philosophes of the 
Encyclopédie, was the brainchild of Count Pietro Verri and his brother, Alessandro Verri. 
Fittingly, the academy of fisticuffs lasted only four years, from 1762 to 1766, but from 
this group emerged the most influential works of the Italian Enlightenment, including, in 
addition to Beccaria’s treatise, Pietro Verri’s Meditazioni sulla felicità (Reflections on 
Happiness) and his Meditazioni sulla economia politica (Reflections on Political 
Economy), as well as other works published in the journal of the academy, Il Caffè.7 
Beccaria was coaxed, encouraged, and assisted in the editing of his manuscript by Pietro 
Verri.8 The treatise was first published in Italian in Livorno on April 12, 1764. It 
4 Ibid 82. 
5 Bellamy, ‘Introduction,’ in Beccaria (1995) ix. 
6 There is debate over Beccaria’s proper title of nobility and, thus, his name. He is often referred to as the 
‘Marquis of Beccaria,’ including in the Encyclopædia Universalis and the Larousse; however, recent 
research suggests that the title of nobility that his grandfather obtained in 1711 was for Gualdrasco and 
Villareggio. See R Zorzi Cesare Beccaria. Il dramma della giustizia (1995) 53 ; M G Vitali-Volant, Cesare 
Beccaria, 1738-1794: cours et discours d'économie politique (2005) 9 ; P Audegean, ‘Introduction,’ in C 
Beccaria, Des délits et des peines. Dei delitti e delle pene (2009) 9.  
7 See generally F Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (1971) 100. 
8 To this day, there continues to be debate about the extent of Pietro Verri’s contribution to the treatise, 
with some claiming that it was written primarily by Verri. See generally G Newman and P Marongiu, 
‘Penological reform and the myth of Beccaria’ (1990) 28 Criminology 330-331.  
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originally appeared anonymously for fear of repercussions given its strong egalitarianism 
and its secular foundations.  
 
 The immediate reception of Beccaria’s little treatise was surprising. It was met at 
first with mixed reviews. It was panned in the Parisian Gazette littéraire de l’Europe as a 
simple restatement of Rousseau’s Social Contract and attacked in Italy as the work of a 
“socialista”—some historians contend that this was the first use of the term “socialist.”9 
More classical jurists found the treatise threatening and dangerous. Pierre-François 
Muyart de Vouglans, the author of several classical penal treatises,10 went so far as to call 
Beccaria’s tract ‘a pleading in favor of that miserable portion of the human species, that 
is its curse and scourge, that dishonors it, and sometimes even seeks to destroy it.’11 
Muyart de Vouglans warned readers of ‘all the dangers of the potential consequences, 
especially with regard to the government, the mores, and the religion of this country.’12  
 
However, Beccaria’s little book soon caught the attention of the Philosophes of 
the Encyclopédie. André Morellet, abbé of the Sorbonne, recalls in his Mémoires that it 
was the statesman, de Malesherbes, who first showed interest in Beccaria’s essay. 
Malesherbes had a few guests over for dinner—Turgot, at the time Intendant of Limoges, 
d’Alembert, the philosopher and co-editor with Diderot of the Encyclopédie, Morellet 
and a few others—and, having just received Beccaria’s tract from Italy, discussed the 
new work with his guests. ‘Try to translate this, de Malesherbes told me,’ Morellet 
recalls. ‘I went into his library, and returned with a translation of the first passage. It 
seemed satisfactory, and I was encouraged to continue. I took the book with me and 
published it in French six weeks later.’13 
 
Morellet’s account may have been embellished,14 but his translation of Beccaria’s 
treatise nevertheless appeared rapidly and was made public at the end of December 1765. 
By January 1766, Morellet sent the young Beccaria the compliments of Diderot and 
d’Alembert, the philosopher Helvétius, the naturalist de Buffon, the baron d’Holbac, as 
well as David Hume who was at the time living in Paris—all of whom, Morellet wrote, 
had read and greatly enjoyed the translation. And Morellet invited Beccaria to Paris.15  
 
Beccaria arrived in October 1766 and in short order met them all, as well as other 
notable thinkers, such as Diderot and Trudaine, and courtesans, such as the marquis de 
Chastellux, Mme. Necker (the wife of Jacques Necker, the future finance minister), and 
9 F Venturi, Italy and the Enlightenment:  Studies in a Cosmopolitan Century (1972) 52-6, 102. 
10 Muyart de Vouglans, Institutes au droit criminel, ou Principes généraux en ces matières (1757); Muyart 
de Vouglans, Institutions criminelles selon les lois et ordonnances du royaume (1762)  
11 Muyart de Vouglans, Réfutation des Principes hasardés dans le Traité des Délits et Peines, traduit de 
l’Italien (1767) 5. 
12 Ibid., 17. 
13 A Morellet, Mémoires inédits de l’abbé Morellet, sur le dix-huitième siècle et sur la Révolution (1967), 
volume I, 163. See generally B Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of 
Natural Order (2011) 54-56. 
14 See Harcourt (2011) 252 n.3. 
15 C Beccaria, Scritti e lettere inediti, E Landry (ed) (1910) 119. 
3 
 
                                                 
Mme. Geoffrin.16 Beccaria began to attend salons, but his stay in Paris was abbreviated. 
He fled Parisian society in less than two months—perceived by many in Paris as a 
simpleton—but his visit was important. He caught the attention of Voltaire, who wrote an 
anonymous pamphlet commenting and praising his work. Voltaire’s commentary, 
Commentaire sur le livre des délits et des peines, would be printed regularly as a preface 
to Morrelet’s translation in all subsequent French editions, propelling Beccaria’s short 
tract to a much larger readership.17 
 
Voltaire confessed, in his preface, that he was ‘ashamed to write about these 
matters after what has been said by the author of On Crimes and Punishments.’18 Voltaire 
added: “I should limit myself to hope that we all and often reread this great work by this 
lover of humanity.”19 In a letter dated May 30, 1768, Voltaire personally thanked 
Beccaria “with all my heart. These sentiments are those of the entire Europe… You toil 
on behalf of reason and humanity, both of which have been quashed for so long. You 
revive those two sisters, beaten for over sixteen hundred years. They are finally 
beginning to walk and talk; but as soon as they do, fanaticism again rears its ugly 
head.”20 
 
 Beccaria’s short tract soon became known as the Enlightenment text on 
punishment. Within several years, as Franco Venturi notes, ‘the triumph of Beccaria’s 
work could not have been more complete in Parisian intellectual circles.’21 And its 
influence extended swiftly well beyond Europe.  Beccaria’s work was lauded by the 
Empress Catherine II of Russia, who invited him to rewrite the Russian penal code. 
Thomas Jefferson copied whole pages of the work into his diary and drew on it in his 
effort to abolish the death penalty.22 Beccaria’s book entered the cannon of political 
theory.23  
 
II. The Second Wave: Blackstone and Bentham 
 
Beccaria’s treatise was translated into English in 1767 and immediately had a profound 
impact on both Blackstone and Bentham. Blackstone’s discussion of punishment in 
Volume 4 of his Commentaries on the Laws of England, published only two years later in 
16 Beccaria (1910) 168-169 [Chastellux letter to Beccaria dated 1/1/1770]; C. Beccaria, Opere, S 
Romagnoli (ed) (1958) 878-892 [Beccaria letter to his wife dated 10/19/1766]; Morellet (1967) Vol I, 167. 
17 Venturi (1972) 106-109. 
18 Voltaire, Commentaire sur le livre Des délits et des peines, par un avocat de province (1766), in 
Voltaire, Œuvres complètes (1853), Volume 5, 411.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Beccaria (1910) 153-154 [Letter attributed to Voltaire].  
21 Venturi (1972) 158. 
22 Venturi (1972) 160. 
23 The success of the book also led to significant recriminations regarding the true author of the manuscript. 
As noted earlier, Pietro Verri claimed that he had written the book and that Beccaria had merely served as a 
namesake; and several years later, the French publicist and attorney Linguet suggested in his review, 
Annales politiques et littéraires, that the French Philosophes of the Encyclopédie were the true authors and 
masterminds of the little treatise, which was so miserably executed by Beccaria that André Morellet had to 
essentially rewrite it in translation. See B Pautrat, ‘L’autre Beccaria,’ in C. Beccaria, Recherches 
concernant la nature du style, 185-206 (2001) 187-188.  
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1769, referred to Beccaria ‘more than any other authority,’24 and Blackstone drew 
especially on Beccaria’s treatise to ground his arguments in favor of proportionality and 
certainty in punishment, preventive rather than punitive justice, and against capital 
punishment.25 As Simon Stern documents, Blackstone became comfortable with the idea 
of introducing reform proposals in his fourth volume of the Commentaries—in contrast to 
the earlier volumes published in 1765—primarily because of Beccaria’s treatise, which 
‘supplied Blackstone with a basis for normative appraisal of the law that suffuses the 
criminal law.’26   
 
Bentham wrote the main manuscript of his first work on the same topic, Rationale 
for Punishment, a few years later in 1775 when he was, in H.L.A. Hart’s words, ‘fresh 
from the study of Beccaria’s already famous book.’27 Beccaria’s tract had a powerful 
influence on Bentham’s work on punishment, as well as, beyond that, Bentham’s 
philosophical outlook and approach. ‘It was from Beccaria’s little treatise on crimes and 
punishments that I drew as I well remember the first hint of the principle by which the 
precision and clearness and incontestableness of mathematical calculations are introduced 
for the first time into the field of morals.’28 Beccaria had, to be sure, emphasized the 
importance of mathematical rigor, noting that all the questions surrounding punishment—
i.e. what is the appropriate punishment, is the death penalty necessary, are torture and 
brutal punishment just, how to prevent crime, etc.—‘need to be answered with a 
mathematical rigour which will cut through the cloud of specious reasoning, seductive 
eloquence and diffident doubt.’29 These passages spoke to Bentham, and, as Hart 
explains, Beccaria’s treatise became the cornerstone of Bentham’s famous conception of 
a ‘moral arithmetic,’ which was at the heart of the utilitarian philosophy that he would 
develop.30 In fact, Bentham traced to Beccaria and Priestley his most central insight—
namely, ‘the sacred truth that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the 
foundation of morals and legislation.’31  
 
Bentham and Beccaria agreed on the major outlines of their arguments: they both 
critiqued the brutalizing effect of excessive punishment and endorsed marginal deterrence 
as a limiting principle on punishment; they both favored speedy and certain punishments 
as a way to reinforce the associations of punishment with crime; and more generally, they 
agreed on the need for formal law and ‘legality’ as giving legitimacy to the criminal 
justice system and the sovereign. Naturally, Bentham did have some reservations about 
Beccaria;32 but on the whole, those pale in comparison to the debt Bentham 
acknowledged—and acknowledged openly. Bentham took pains to express how much 
Beccaria had contributed to his own development:  
 
24 Simon Stern, William Blackstone, this volume, __.  
25 Ibid., __.  
26 Ibid., __.  
27 Hart (1982) 45.  
28 Ibid. 40.  
29 Beccaria (1995) 30.  
30 Hart (1982) 40; see generally G Binder, Bentham, this volume, __.  
31 Hart (1982) 40. 
32 Hart (1982) 48-52.  
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‘Oh my master, first evangelist of Reason, you who have raised your Italy so far 
above England, and I would add above France, were it not that Helvétius, without 
having written on the subject of laws, had already provided you with your 
fundamental ideas; . . . you who have made so many useful excursions into the 
path of utility, what is there left for us to do? —Never to turn aside from that 
path.’33  
 
III. A Theoretical Amalgam  
 
As a classic expression of deterrence theory and the quintessential illustration of the 
classical school of thought in criminology, it might come as a surprise that Beccaria 
opens his treatise in the language of social contract theory—what most utilitarians, such 
as Bentham and John Stuart Mill, would later refer to as unnecessary fiction or, more 
simply, as ‘pestilential nonsense’ or ‘nonsense upon stilts.’34 Not so for Beccaria.  
 
a. Foundations in Social Contract Theory 
 
 On Crimes and Punishments rests, from the very first chapter, on a social contract 
foundation: state sovereignty, Beccaria writes, is the sum total of the freedom that 
individuals relinquish in exchange for a measure of security, and, in this sense, the 
political sovereign is vested with the legitimate right to provide security and to embody 
the public well-being. In fact, Beccaria begins his treatise with a bow and a wink to 
Hobbes—echoing in part, but also drawing a slight distinction: ‘Wearied by living in an 
unending state of war and by a freedom rendered useless by the uncertainty of retaining 
it,’ Beccaria writes, echoing Hobbes up to that point, ‘they sacrifice a part of that 
freedom in order to enjoy what remains in security and calm.’35  
 
The first clause is clearly drawn from the Leviathan,36 and Beccaria would make 
explicit reference to Hobbes in the preface to the fifth Italian edition of Dei delitti e delle 
pene. But although Beccaria agreed with Hobbes that the state of nature was a state of 
war and that the desire for security led individuals to form ‘the sovereignty of the 
nation,’37 Beccaria nevertheless disagreed with Hobbes that individuals relinquished all 
liberty to the Leviathan: on Beccaria’s theory, individuals only relinquished the smallest 
part necessary to achieve security, or, in his words, ‘the smallest possible portion 
consistent with persuading others to defend him.’38 And it is this limitation on the 
bequest that would serve to limit the exercise of sovereign power.  
33 Quoted in Young (1983) 318; also in E Halévy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, M Morris 
(trans) (1955) 21. 
34 J Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies,’ in Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke, and Marx on the Rights of 
Man, J Waldron (ed) (1987) 53 (referring specifically to the natural rights discourse, which often grounds 
social contract theory).  
35 Beccaria (1995) 9 (emphasis added).  
36 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part II, Chapter XVII. 
37 Beccaria (1995) 9.  
38 Beccaria (1995) 11. Although individuals preserve a right of self-defense on Hobbes’s account, they 
nevertheless relinquish more rights and powers to the sovereign. For a discussion, see A Ristroph, ‘Respect 
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For Beccaria, the principal means of enforcing the social contract was 
punishment—the State-imposed penal sanction. It is punishment that keeps individuals 
from trying to seize back that small part of freedom that they relinquished, a constant 
struggle given that men are by nature, according to Beccaria, so self-interested and 
passionate. But having bequeathed only the smallest portion of their freedom necessary to 
ensure their security, there is an inherent limitation to the extent, mode, and scope of 
punishment: ‘The sum of these smallest possible portions constitutes the right to punish,’ 
Beccaria emphasized; ‘everything more than that is no longer justice, but an abuse; it is a 
matter of fact not of right.’39 The social contract itself, then, would place limits on the 
sovereign’s right to punish. Notice the political theory dimension of Beccaria’s 
analysis—as opposed to a possible religious or natural law foundation. Beccaria’s work 
was a contribution to politics, not, as he explained, to theology or natural law.40 In this 
sense, Beccaria was one of the first theorists who treated punishment as a matter of state 
legitimacy and political obligation, rather than from a moral or religious point of view—
what evil people or sinners deserve. This is precisely what led Beccaria, naturally, to fear 
persecution and to publish the first edition anonymously.  
 
b. ‘The greatest happiness shared among the greater number’  
 
 Grounded in social contract theory, Beccaria nevertheless embedded a utilitarian 
core into his analysis. The limitations on the right to punish—justified only to the extent 
necessary to produce security and order—are precisely what allow individuals to enjoy 
the greatest possible liberty that is left to each and every one of them. ‘The juster the 
punishments,’ Beccaria emphasized, ‘the more sacred and inviolable is the security and 
the greater the freedom which the sovereign preserves for his subjects.’41 The metric of 
just punishments and of just laws—the metric of justice—is precisely the greater good of 
the individuals, or, as Beccaria writes in his very Introduction, ‘whether or not [the laws] 
conduce to the greatest happiness shared among the greater number.’42 Justice, Beccaria 
emphasizes to his reader, is ‘what is socially useful,’43 and it is in this manner that 
Beccaria weaves together contract theory and utilitarianism. 
 
Beccaria was an early proponent of the idea that pleasure and pain are the metrics 
and motives of human action. ‘The proximate and efficient cause of actions is the flight 
from pain, their final cause is the love of pleasure.’44 The notion of maximizing social 
welfare was central to Beccaria’s work, and the notion of social utility that Beccaria 
developed in On Crimes and Punishments drew heavily on the work of his compatriot 
and Resistance in Punishment Theory,’ 97 California Law Review 601, 609-610; A Ristrophe, Hobbes, this 
volume.   
39 Beccaria (1995) 11.  
40 Beccaria (1995) 4 (‘There are three sources from which the principles of morals and politics which guide 
men are drawn: revelation, natural law and the conventions arrived at by society… To consider the 
concerns of the last of them does not exclude concern with the first two.’) 
41 Beccaria (1995) 10 (emphasis added).  
42 Beccaria (1995) 7.  
43 Beccaria (1995) 5.  
44 Beccaria (1995)157. 
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and fellow fisticuff, Pietro Verri. In his Reflections on Happiness, published a year earlier 
in 1763, Verri articulated the keystone to their new philosophical approach: the central 
concept of happiness. ‘The end of the social pact,’ Verri wrote in 1763, ‘is the well-being 
of each of the individuals who join together to form society, who do so in order that this 
well-being becomes absorbed into the public happiness or rather the greatest possible 
happiness distributed with the greatest equality possible.’45   
 
 Beccaria’s and Verri’s conception of social welfare was somewhat unique in its 
emphasis on equality. Beccaria’s text was very much a rejection and reaction against the 
privileges of the aristocracy and notions of natural hierarchy. A major theme running 
through the book is that the nobility, the rich and the powerful should be subject to the 
same forms of punishment and should not be able to buy their way out of justice. It is a 
constant refrain—barring which, as Beccaria writes, “wealth feeds tyranny.”46 The 
resulting conception of utility focuses, as Richard Bellamy correctly suggests, on the goal 
of maximizing equally the happiness of each individual.47  
 
 The notion of maximizing social welfare is thus at the heart of Beccaria’s work; 
however, the relationship between his utilitarian analysis and the retributive elements in 
his writings is a source of continuing debate and it would be naïve to label Beccaria 
purely utilitarian.48 By placing the right to punish squarely within a social contract 
framework, Beccaria had drawn on notions of rights and duties that provide independent 
limits and constraints on the sovereign’s power to punish—along lines that are more 
familiar to retributive theory. For Beccaria, the two frameworks—social contract and 
utilitarianism—overlap, coincide, and there is no theoretical tension or potential conflict 
between the different principles and rationalities. They work together, harmoniously, to 
justify and support his arguments.   
 
c. Limits on Punishment  
 
 The right to punish, for Beccaria, is limited to what is absolutely necessary to 
defend the public well-being. It is, in this sense, a necessary evil, necessary insofar as it is 
the only way to restrain the passions—for, as Beccaria, writes, ‘experience shows that the 
common run of men do not accept stable principles of conduct.’49 Anything further—any 
punishment beyond what is strictly necessary to restrain men—is ‘tyrannous’: ‘Any 
punishment that goes beyond the need to preserve this bond is unjust by its very 
nature.’50 At the same time, punishment must be related to the harm associated with the 
criminal offense, and the metric of harm, for Beccaria, is to be measured by the harm to 
society, not, as it is for retributivists, by the mens rea or the evil intent of the offender: 
‘the one true measure of criminality is the damage done to the nation and … therefore, 
45 Quoted in R. Bellamy, ‘Introduction,’ in Beccaria (1995) xiv. 
46 Beccaria (1995) 50.  
47 Bellamy in Beccaria (1995) xix.  
48 D B Young, ‘Cesare Beccaria: Utilitarian or Retributivist?’ 11 Journal of Criminal Justice 317-326 
(1983). 
49 Beccaria (1995) 9.  
50 Beccaria (1995) 10 and 11.  
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those who believe that the true measure of criminality lies in the malefactor’s intention 
are mistaken.’51  
 
 On these grounds, the proper amount of punishment, on Beccaria’s account, 
becomes simply what is necessary to prevent future similar acts of criminality—what we 
would call today ‘specific deterrence’ of a particular individual from committing future 
crimes and ‘general deterrence’ of other possible individuals. The purpose of punishment 
is not backward looking, Beccaria emphasizes: it is not to undo a crime already 
committed. ‘The wailings of a wretch,’ Beccaria writes, cannot ‘undo what has been done 
and turn back the clock.’52 There is no way to undo harm—nor, through punishment, to 
balance out or even out the past harm. In this respect, Beccaria is assuredly not a 
retributivist in the Kantian or Hegelian mold. The purpose of punishment to Beccaria ‘is 
nothing other than to prevent the offender from doing fresh harm to his fellows and to 
deter other from doing likewise.’53  
 
 The result is a strict limitation on the extent of punishment the sovereign can meet 
out. Beccaria embeds, in his treatise, a limiting principle that operates simply as follows: 
“If a punishment is to serve its purpose, it is enough that the harm of punishment should 
outweigh the good which the criminal can derive from the crime, and into the calculation 
of this balance, we must add the unerringness of the punishment and the loss of the good 
produced by the crime. Anything more than this is superfluous and, therefore, 
tyrannous.’54  
 
d. Proportionality of Punishment 
 
 This limitation on punishment injects a strong element of proportionality into the 
analysis—a distinctive and characteristic feature of Beccaria’s treatise. It is the element 
of proportionality that ensures the proper functioning of punishment—namely, to create 
that ‘lasting association in the human mind between the two ideas crime and 
punishment.’55 Although it has a utilitarian pedigree, Beccaria infuses the notion of 
proportionality with a retributive character. Beccaria argues that there should be a ‘fit’ 
between the crime and punishment and that this fit is necessary to reinforce the 
association: ‘The punishment should, as far as possible, fit the nature of the crime;’ this, 
he adds, ‘serves admirably to draw even closer the important connection between a 
misdeed and its punishment.’56 The fit helps reinforce the relationship between the two. 
(Notice that this idea of reinforcing the association between crime and punishment is 
heavily influenced by David Hume and his theory of the association of ideas). 
 
It is precisely the existence of proportionality between the severity of the crime 
and the severity of the punishment that reflects, for Beccaria, the level of civilization and 
51 Beccaria (1995) 22.  
52 Beccaria (1995) 31.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Beccaria (1995) 64.  
55 Beccaria (1995) 49.  
56 Beccaria (1995) 49. 
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humanity of a county. Beccaria proposes creating ‘a scale of wrong actions’ and ‘a 
corresponding scale of punishments running from the harshest to the mildest,’ and then 
suggests that ‘If there were an exact and universal scale of crimes and punishments, we 
should have an approximate and common measure of the gradations of tyranny and 
liberty, and of the basic humanity and evil of the different nations.’57  
 
e. Marginal Deterrence and Other Rules  
 
 Beccaria also sets forth, in On Crimes and Punishments, the principle of marginal 
deterrence that will later become a cornerstone of the economic model of crime and 
punishment: ‘If an equal punishment is laid down for two crimes which damage society 
equally, men will not have a stronger deterrent against committing the greater crime if 
they find it more advantageous to do so.’58 He also sets out a number of other rules that 
strongly influenced Bentham and later economic theorists. For instance, Beccaria 
suggests in his work that: 
 
1. the certainty of punishment should take priority over the harshness of the 
punishment—a familiar thesis today.59 As Beccaria wrote, ‘One of the most 
effective brakes on crime is not the harshness of its punishment, but the 
unerringness of punishment…  The certainty of even a mild punishment will 
make a bigger impression than the fear of a more awful one which is united to 
a hope of not being punished at all.’60  
2. The harsher the punishment, the more likely the criminal will commit more 
crimes to avoid it—or, as Beccaria wrote, ‘the more anxious the criminal is to 
avoid it, and it makes him commit other crimes to escape the punishment of 
the first.’61 
3. The brutality of punishment will adversely affect the savageness of 
criminality, or as he wrote, “As punishments become harsher, human souls. . . 
become hardened.”62 Individuals in society, he suggested, get accustomed 
even to the harshest of punishments.63  
4. Attempt should be punished less severely than a completed crime in order to 
give an incentive to the culprit not to complete the crime64—again, a notion of 
marginal deterrence that was highly influential on subsequence economic 
theorists.65 
5. Prison should be reserved for those who cannot pay fines, again a familiar 
thesis in modern economic analysis.66 Beccaria wrote: ‘Thefts without 
57 Beccaria (1995) 20.  
58 Beccaria (1995) 21.  
59 A M Polinsky and S Shavell, ‘The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,’ in Handbook of Law and 
Economics, Volume I, Polinsky and Shavell (eds.), Chapter 6, 405-450. 
60 Beccaria (1995) 63. 
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid., 64. 
64 Ibid., 95.  
65 Posner (1985) __.  
66 Posner (1985) __; Becker (1968) __. 
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violence should be punished with fines… [S]ince this is generally the crime of 
poverty and desperation, the crime of that unhappy section of men to whom 
the perhaps ‘terrible’ and ‘unnecessary’ right to property has allowed nothing 
but a bare existence… the most fitting punishment shall be the only sort of 
slavery which can be called just, namely the temporary enslavement of the 
labour and person of the criminal to society…’67 
 
 
f. Legal Formalism 
 
 Overarching all of these rules is a principle of legal formalism. Beccaria was 
wedded to the rule of law and advocated strongly in favor of judging by syllogism. ‘The 
judge should construct a perfect syllogism about every criminal case,” Beccaria 
emphasized; ‘the major premise should be the general law; the minor, the conformity or 
otherwise of the action with the law; and the conclusion, freedom or punishment.’68 
Beccaria was weary of realist arguments and approaches to the law. He anticipate and 
cautioned against the American Legal Realist insights about judging,69 and argued that 
‘Nothing is more dangerous than the popular saw that we ought to consult the spirit of the 
law.’70  
 
Beccaria’s legal formalism was premised on notions of universalism, equality, 
and respect—on deontological principles—but also on utilitarian premises. He argued 
that the certainty of syllogistic reasoning is what produces, among citizens, a sense of 
justice that is so important to the legitimacy of the sovereign. Happiness depends on the 
subject thinking that he is not being exploited by his sovereign, and happiness thus calls 
for rational punishment, proportionality, and leniency. It is also what ensures the 
competitive edge of the sovereign nation and the fidelity of its people: ‘The surest way to 
bind men to their homeland is to raise the relative well-being of everyone of them. . . . 
[S]o the sovereign’s and the nation’s highest interest lies in ensuring that, compared with 
neighbouring countries, the total amount of happiness in the nation be greater than 
elsewhere.’71 
 
g. Beccaria on Capital Punishment 
 
  Beccaria’s precocious argument against the death penalty is in large part what 
propelled his treatise to fame. His argument sounded, again, in social contract: 
individuals only give the slightest bit of freedom to the sovereign in order to achieve 
security, and this could never include the right of the sovereign to kill a subject. Life is 
the greatest good of all, not some small measure of freedom. It would make no sense, 
Beccaria argued, to give this right to the sovereign. ‘Who has ever willingly given up to 
67 Beccaria (1995) 53. 
68 Beccaria (1995) 14.  
69 Beccaria in fact anticipated the American Legal Realists in suggesting that a freewheeling judge might be 
led to decide cases based on ‘the state of his digestion.’ Beccaria (1995) 15; see Jerome Frank, Law and the 
Modern Mind (1930) 34 (suggesting that a judge’s decision might turn on what he ate for breakfast). 
70 Beccaria (1995) 14.  
71 Beccaria (1995) 84.  
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others the authority to kill him?’72 Men do not even have the right to commit suicide, 
Beccaria suggested, how could they give to another the right to punish them with death? 
 
 The death penalty, according to Beccaria, did not fall in the domain of the right 
and just, but in the domain of war, which had its own rules of necessity and utility. Even 
in that realm, though, Beccaria argued that capital punishment was neither necessary nor 
useful. Not necessary because long-draw-out punishments, such as penal servitude or 
slavery for life, are more effective and fear-inducing than the fleeting shock of death: 
‘Much more potent than the idea of death, which men always regard as vague and distant, 
is the efficacious because often repeated reflection that I too shall be reduced to so 
dreary and so pitiable a state if I commit similar crimes.’73 Not useful because capital 
punishment has a brutalizing effect on society, ‘because of the example of savagery it 
gives to men.’74 
 
 Bentham agreed with Beccaria’s argument, and, in fact, went so far as to state that 
Beccaria had said everything that needed to be said. As Bentham wrote, ‘the more 
attention one gives to the punishment of death the more he will be inclined to adopt the 
opinion of Beccaria—that it ought to be disused. This subject is so ably discussed in his 
book that to treat it after him is a work that may well be dispensed with.’75 Blackstone as 
well favored Beccaria’s argument and drew on it when he proposed that non-capital 
punishments were ‘more suited to the genius of the English law.’76 
 
By contrast, both Kant and Hegel criticize Beccaria’s argument harshly. Kant, 
who defended the right to capital punishment as a core pillar of his retributive theory of 
punishment and the idea of lex talionis, accused Beccaria’s in The Metaphysics of Morals 
of ‘pure sophistry and distortion of the principles of right.’77 Kant focused his venom on 
Beccaria’s argument from social contract. While Kant agreed with Beccaria that a citizen 
cannot wish his own punishment or dispose of his own life, he disagreed that this is what 
is called for by the social contract. All that is called for is that each individual agree to 
submit to the laws, including penal laws. Kant wrote: ‘To say: “I wish to be punished if I 
murder anyone” means nothing more than “I submit along with the rest of the people to 
the laws, which, if there are criminals among the people, will naturally include penal 
laws.”’78 Those laws, Kant argued, are then enforced not by the individual, but by the 
courts and administrators of justice. In no case does the individual take his own life: it is 
not the criminal himself, but the court of public justice that applies the law and executes 
its sentence.  
 
 Hegel attacked Beccaria’s conception of the sovereign state, whose purpose, 
Hegel explained, was not to protect or provide for the individuals. In the Philosophy of 
72 Beccaria (1995) 66.  
73 Beccaria (1995) 67.  
74 Beccaria (1995) 70. 
75 H L A Hart, ‘Bentham and Beccaria,’ in Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory (1982) 
41. 
76 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 4 (1769) 138; Stern, Blackstone, __.  
77 I Kant, Political Writings, Hans Reiss (ed.) (1970) 158; see generally M Dan-Cohen, Kant, this volume.  
78 Ibid.  
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Right, Hegel targeted Beccaria especially: ‘the state is not a contract at all nor is its 
fundamental essence the unconditional protection and guarantee of the life and property 
of members of the public as individuals. On the contrary, it is that higher entity which 
even lays claim to this very life and property and demands its sacrifice.’79 The concept of 
right, for Hegel, encompasses the criminal’s right to be punished in accordance with his 
crime and pursuant to reason-governed logic, and, thus, to be treated with honor as a 
rational being.80 Despite this disagreement, though, Hegel applauded Beccaria for 
focusing attention on the death penalty and for helping to bring about a more rational 
appreciation of this extreme punishment. After criticizing Beccaria, Hegel added: 
‘However that may be, Beccaria’s endeavor to have capital punishment abolished has had 
beneficial effects. Even if neither Joseph II nor the French ever succeeded in entirely 
abolishing it, still we have begun to see which crimes deserve the death penalty and 
which do not. Capital punishment has in consequence become rarer, as in fact should be 
the case with this most extreme punishment.’81  
 
 Beccaria’s central arguments against capital punishment—namely, that the 
brutalizing effects of executions outweigh their deterrent effect and that more effective 
deterrence can be achieved by means of life sentences—were empirical in nature; despite 
the lack of any empirical evidence, though, Beccaria would follow his intuitions, as 
would Bentham, and oppose the death penalty. By contrast, more than two hundred years 
later, still in an empirical vacuum, their heirs at the University of Chicago—Gary Becker 
and Richard Posner—would express contrary intuitions and espouse capital 
punishment.82 ‘To summarize once again my position on this controversial question,’ 
Becker would affirm in 2005, ‘I favor capital punishment because and only because I 
believe it has ‘sizeable’ deterrent effects.’83 
 
IV. Modern Appropriations of Beccaria  
 
Despite this remarkable difference on capital punishment, the Chicago School of law and 
economics would enlist Beccaria’s name and writings in their project to extend, as 
Beccaria himself had, the rational actor model to crime and punishment. Beccaria’s 
theoretical approach would shape the sensibilities of modern economic theory—in 
several respects. First, regarding to the use of mathematics. Beccaria is perhaps the first 
to ever have deployed mathematical modeling to analyze criminality. He published an 
article on smuggling in 1764—the same year he released his famous treatise—that set 
forth, with the use of mathematical equations and algebra, the expected relationship 
between tariffs, contraband, and sovereign revenue. It appeared originally as an essay in 
volume XV of Il Caffè—the review that Beccaria and the Verri brothers were publishing, 
in the image of the Spectator. The article, Tentativo analitico su i contraband (A Sketch 
79 G W F Hegel, Philosophy of Right, T M Knox (trans) (1981) 71 (para. 100).  
80 A Brudner, Hegel, in this volume, __[around p. 36 of draft].  
81 Ibid., 247 (note to paragraph 100). 
82 G S Becker and R A Posner, Uncommon Sense: Economic Insights, from Marriage to Terrorism (2009), 
p. 253-258; see generally G S Becker, F Ewald and B Harcourt, ‘“Becker and Foucault on Crime and 
Punishment” A Conversation with Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt: The Second 
Session, The University of Chicago – May 15, 2013’ Carceral Notebooks Volume 9 (2013). 
83 Becker, Uncommon Sense, 258. 
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of a Formal Model on the Question of Contraband) is remembered today only for its 
method—for using mathematical equations to solve an economic question, especially at 
such an early date. Joseph Schumpeter, in his magisterial review of the history of 
economic thought, recognized only three precursors to modern econometrics: Daniel 
Bernouilli for a 1731 article on probabilities; Achille Nicolas Isnard for a treatise in 1781; 
and Beccaria for this article published in 1764.84  
 
Beccaria’s endeavor, in that 1764 article, was to figure out the amount of potential 
contraband that a merchant had to smuggle in order for the merchant to come out even—
to retain the same amount of capital as he originally had in his merchandise—given 
different rates of tariff imposed by the sovereign authorities and given that he would 
likely lose some of his contraband. Beccaria was essentially trying to figure out, for the 
sovereign, how to fix the tariff at the most advantageous level to maximize the return to 
the treasury. ‘We are trying to determine how much a merchant ought to defraud the 
king’s right, in terms of the value of any given commodity, such that, even if he loses the 
rest, he ends up with the same amount of capital as before thanks to the profit from 
smuggling.’85  
 
In order to resolve this question, Beccaria went through a sequence of algebraic 
equations and drew from them a general theorem: ‘given equal spatial capacity, a steady 
surveillance, and maximum industriousness by the merchants, the nisus to offset the tariff 
with the contraband will be equal to the square of the value of the merchandise, divided 
by the sum of that value and the tariff.’86 This research, Beccaria added, should help the 
authorities set tariffs at the optimal level in order to maximize its revenues and balance 
trade. ‘Determining such values in a general sense can elucidate how to design a tariff,’ 
Beccaria claimed.87 And he concluded from his study: ‘The advantage of this research, 
for the drafter of tariffs, will be to know how much smuggling to expect from the 
merchants even after a certain number of seizures.’88 Beccaria’s study would be a 
precursor to the law and economics movement, especially as applied to criminal law.  
 
 Second, and at a more general level, Beccaria heavily influenced the theoretical 
framework of the modern economic approach to crime and punishment pioneered in the 
mid-twentieth century by scholars such as Gary Becker in economics and Richard Posner 
in law at the University of Chicago. The modern economic model of crime is premised on 
the ideas, developed by Beccaria and Bentham, that individuals pursue self-interest by 
trying to avoid pain and to seek pleasure—that individuals maximize their overall 
satisfaction or utility by choosing those opportunities that optimize their preferences.  
 
84 J Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (1968) 955 and 179. 
85 C Beccaria, “Tentative analytique sur les contrebandes” in C Beccaria, Recherches concernant la nature 
du style, 179-183, B Pautrat (trans) (2001) 182. 
86 Beccaria (2001) 183.  
87 Beccaria (2001) 182.  
88 Beccaria (2001) 183.  
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Becker reinvigorated this tradition with his seminal paper, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, published in 1968.89 Becker’s economic model of 
crime—premised on the Beccarian idea that criminal behavior was influenced by 
calculation of the costs and benefits of committing crime—did away with many of the 
other explanations of crime offered by psychologists and sociologists. As Becker 
suggested in his paper, ‘A useful theory of criminal behavior can dispense with special 
theories of anomie, psychological inadequacies, or inheritance of special traits, and 
simply extend the economist’s usual analysis of choice.’90 The modern economic model 
assumed only that an individual—any one of us—would engage in illegal activity as long 
as the benefits outweigh the costs. Becker’s model generated a swell of research and 
attracted a coterie of young economists and Ph.D. students to the field of crime and 
punishment—most notably, Steven Levitt, author of Freakonomics.  
 
As Becker recognizes and emphasizes in his influential 1968 paper, the source of 
the approach can be found in Beccaria: ‘Lest the reader be repelled by the apparent 
novelty of an “economic” framework for illegal behavior, let him recall that two 
important contributors to criminology during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
Beccaria and Bentham, explicitly applied an economic calculus. Unfortunately, such an 
approach has lost favor during the last hundred years, and my efforts can be viewed as a 
resurrection, modernization, and thereby I hope improvement on these much earlier 
pioneering studies.’91 
  
In American legal circles today, as a result, it is the economist Beccaria that often 
comes to mind—rather than the Enlightenment humanitarian. Beccaria has been 
canonized as the first economist to have applied rational choice theory to the field of 
crime and punishment. He is portrayed as the founder of the economic analysis of crime: 
the first to have rigorously applied the tools and logic of utilitarian calculus to criminal 
justice issues. And this, too, is by no means out of character. After all, after fleeing 
Parisian society and returning to Milan in 1766, Beccaria was appointed to one of only 
three chairs in public economy established during the eighteenth century—the newly 
created Professor of Cameral Sciences at the Palatine School in Milan in 1768.92 Beccaria 
taught public economy for two years, before entering public service as an economic 
advisor and civil servant for the Milanese republic—until his sudden death in 1794.  
 
Schumpeter places Beccaria at the fountainhead of classical economic theory—
with Adam Smith and Turgot. Schumpeter in fact called Beccaria “the Italian A. Smith,” 
and Adam Smith “the Scottish Beccaria.”93 And contemporary liberal economists also 
embrace Beccaria as one of their own. Richard Posner traces his intellectual genealogy, 
89 G Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” 76 The Journal of Political Economy 169-
217 (1968). 
90 Becker (1968) 170.  
91 Becker (1968) 209. 
92 P Groenewegen, Eighteenth Century Economics: Turgot, Beccaria, Smith and their contemporaries 
(2002) 40 n.2; Beccaria (1995) 129 n.1 & 2; Pautrat 2001:187. The other two chairs in political economy 
were bestowed on Genovesi in Naples in 1754 and P N Christiernin in Uppsala in the 1760s. Groenewegen 
(2002) 40 n.2.  
93 Schumpeter (1968) 179 and 180.  
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in the area of criminal law, specifically to Beccaria. In introducing his economic model of 
the criminal law, Posner states: ‘The economic analysis of criminal law began on a very 
high plane in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with the work of Beccaria and 
Bentham, but its revival in modern times dates only from 1968, when Gary Becker’s 
article on the economics of crime and punishment appeared.’94  
 
Much like Becker and Posner, Beccaria sought to extend the logic of economic 
rationality to the social sphere—to the field of crime and punishment. Beccaria believed 
that the logic of economics could tame and civilize society, could guide policy in the 
social domain, could determine right from wrong, just from unjust punishment. His 
project in On Crimes and Punishments was precisely to extend economic rationality to 
the penal sphere, so as to achieve there what had been achieved in the field of 
commercial exchange. As he wrote in his Introduction:  
 
We have discovered the true relations between sovereign and subjects and 
between nation and nation. Commerce has been stimulated by philosophic truths 
… and there is waged among nations a silent war by trade, which is the most 
humane sort of war and more worthy of reasonable men. Such is the progress we 
owe to the present enlightened century. But there are very few who have 
scrutinized and fought against the savagery and the disorderliness of the 
procedures of criminal justice, a part of legislation which is so prominent and so 
neglected in almost the whole of Europe.95 
 
That was precisely the goal that Beccaria set for himself: to impose economic rationality 
on the barbaric sphere of punishment; to civilize and tame punishment the way that 
commerce tamed man; to harmonize the economic and penal spheres.  
 
But there are crucial differences that set Beccaria apart from contemporary 
liberals economists who appropriate his name. The economic rationality that Beccaria 
sought to impose in the punishment field was not the self-regulating, free market system. 
It was, instead, an economic regime of minute governmental administration of every 
aspect of commerce. It was the economic model of eighteenth century policing—what is 
referred to as cameralism or, in German, Cameralwissenschaft or Polizeiwissenschaft.96 
It is the model of policing that is generally associated with the policing of the Parisian 
grain markets in the eighteenth century.97 Beccaria’s idea of ‘the progress we owe to the 
present enlightened century’ was not the liberalization of trade, but rather the intense 
administration of markets and commerce.  
 
A good window into his economic thought was precisely his short article from 
1764 on smuggling. What is clear from the essay is that Beccaria was not in the business 
94 R Posner, “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,” 85 Columbia Law Review (1985) 1193. 
95 Beccaria (1995) 8. 
96 See generally A Wakefield, The Disordered Police State: German Cameralism as Science and Practice 
(2009); M Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of American Government (2005); M 
Dubber and M Valverde, The New Police Science: The Police Power in Domestic and International 
Governance (2006). 
97 See generally Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets (2011). 
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of eliminating government tariffs, but instead of mathematically calculating the optimal 
rate of taxation in order to maximize the sovereign’s revenue. This was a cameral 
science—the economics of how to maximize the prince’s wealth using all the tools of 
state intervention. And in this sense, Beccaria was in no way a precursor of liberal 
economic thought. To the contrary: Here he was, only 25 years old, and he placed himself 
in the role of advisor to the prince—well before he would become an advisor to the 
Republic. He was not yet working for the Milanese republic—and would not become a 
civil servant for another seven years. He was a young intellectual—yet he viewed 
himself, he identified as the prince’s counselor figuring out how best to maximize the 
sovereign’s revenues through taxation.  
 
Beccaria’s other lectures and writings in public economy come down to us as 
fragments mostly. His inaugural lecture, from when he assumed his chair as professor of 
public economy at the Palatine School of Milan, was immediately translated into English 
and published in 1769, and as we shall see in French as well—in the Éphémérides, the 
journal of the Physiocrats.98 The full lecture notes from Beccaria’s course in public 
economy were published posthumously in Italian in 1804 under the title Elementi di 
economia pubblica—‘Elements of Public Economy,’ though the notes have never been 
translated into English or French for that matter.  
 
Beccaria’s lectures on public economy were divided into five major sections: 
agriculture, arts and manufacturing, commerce, finance, and police—with an introductory 
part at first setting out the outline and general principles. The final section, titled “Of 
Police,” formed an integral part of his lectures on public economy—it represented an 
entire section alongside commerce and finance, and it covered both policing and taxation. 
But by a curious twist of fate, Beccaria’s lecture notes on “police”—as well as those on 
taxation and public finance—are missing. The Elementi that have come down to us today 
contain parts I, II, III, and IV, but they go no further. The lectures on “police” have never 
been found and so have gone predominantly unnoticed—an accident of history that has 
perhaps distorted some readings of Beccaria’s writings on punishment. 
 
V. Beccaria and the French Economists 
 
Beccaria’s views on policing, however, did not escape the Physiocrats—a group of 
French thinkers in the eighteenth century who were the first to be called ‘economists,’ 
including most notably François Quesnay and Pierre-Samuel Dupont de Nemours.99 
Beccaria, it seems, had not met Quesnay or Dupont during his visit to Paris in 1766—in 
fact, it is not clear whether Beccaria was exposed to Physiocratic thought at all while he 
was in Paris. Those who surrounded him and received him in Paris were primarily in the 
circle of Philosophes and they included several thinkers who were arch opponents of the 
Physiocrats. From Beccaria’s correspondence, it appears, he first came to the attention of 
the Physiocrats in 1769—three years after his short visit.  
 
98 The Discourses are also reproduced as Beccaria’s Inaugural Lecture to the Milanese professorship in 
Bellamy’s edition of On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings (1995).  
99 See generally Harcourt (2011).  
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Dupont, as editor-in-chief of the Ephémérides du citoyen, the Physiocrats’ 
journal, was proud to announce Beccaria’s appointment to the chair in political economy 
in his third volume of the Ephémérides in 1769.100 Dupont praised Beccaria for being one 
of the first recognized economists, but at the same time, used the announcement to 
underscore the deep differences between Beccaria and the Physiocrats—differences that 
traced to Beccaria’s earlier treatise, On Crimes and Punishments.101 Dupont focused his 
critique primarily on the question of the right to property, suggesting that Beccaria had 
not properly recognized the importance of that right: ‘the right to property,’ Dupont 
emphasized, ‘is not a terrible right,’ and ‘contraband is not a theft on the Treasury,’ he 
added.102  
 
Beccaria had included a chapter on contraband in his little tract, where he had 
advocated severe punishment, including the galleys, for smuggling: ‘such a crime 
deserves a fairly heavy punishment,’ Beccaria wrote, ‘even up to imprisonment or penal 
servitude.’103 In the case of a tobacco smuggler, for instance, Beccaria prescribed a prison 
regime including ‘toil and exertion in the excise service which [the smuggler] wished to 
defraud.’104 Dupont’s reaction in the Ephémérides was visceral and it centered around the 
notion of private property. To Dupont, the real criminals are not those who smuggle 
contraband, but those who regulate commerce: ‘If there is, then, a true offense that 
deserves prison and penal servitude, it’s not that of the smugglers, but that of the 
Regulators who have proposed and still propose, who have compelled and still compel 
the adoption of royal edicts that hamper trade, of fiscal inquisitions, and of monopolistic 
threats to the natural rights of citizens, to their property, to their civil liberty, deterring 
useful work, and as fearsome for public as for private wealth.’105 
 
A few months later, Dupont published a translation of Beccaria’s inaugural 
lecture in economics in the Ephémérides, but annotated the text heavily in the margin.106 
His disagreement, in passages, is sharp—at times vitriolic. Dupont began by criticizing 
Beccaria’s method, which, he suggested, starts with the particular instead of beginning 
with general principles and first truths. The wrong method, Dupont declared, ‘led M. de 
Beccaria astray’ and made him ‘take very thin consequences for general principles, and 
very dangerous errors for general truths.’107 Dupont hoped that, with some guidance, the 
young Italian economist ‘would change considerably his opinions on very many 
points.’108  
 
100 Ephémérides du citoyen, ou bibliothèque raisonnée des sciences morales et politiques, 1769, Tome 
Troisième, Dupont de Nemours (ed.) (1769) 159-181. 
101 Ibid. 178 (« Nous nous chargerions volontiers par exemple de démontrer quelques vérités dont M. le 
Marquis de BECCARIA n’étoit pas encore convaincu lorsqu’il a publié son excellent Ouvrage des Délits & 
des Peines »). 
102 Ibid. 178 (« le droit de propriété n’est pas un droit terrible, ») and 179 (« la contrebande n’est point un 
vol fait au Fisc »). 
103 Beccaria (1995) 88. 
104 Beccaria (1995) 88. 
105 Ephémérides (1769), vol. 3, 180-81.  
106 Ephémérides (1769), vol. 6, 53-152. 
107 Ephémérides (1769), vol. 6, 66-67 n.5. 
108 Ephémérides (1769), vol. 6, 67 n.5.  
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Dupont was extremely critical. In his lecture, Beccaria had advocated placing 
tariffs and charges on the importation of value-added products and on the exportation of 
primary resources. Dupont took issue: ‘it is distressing to hear again these alleged 
maxims that have caused so much harm, especially from a Philosopher, from an 
illustrious Professor, charged by the state to refute political errors and to substitute them 
with the knowledge of useful truths.’109 Dupont dedicated eight long pages to disparaging 
Beccaria and his policy proposals, suggesting that they inevitably will lead to an 
impoverished nation that manufactures nothing but luxury goods, and then concluded, 
‘we have already said enough perhaps to show a Philosopher as shrewd as M. le Marquis 
de Beccaria that trying to make a People more industrial than liberty and instruction 
would lead them, amounts to a completely wrongheaded understanding of politics.’110  
 
Dupont attacked Beccaria for suggesting in his treatise that merchants who 
engage in evasive measures such as smuggling contraband, should be sent ‘aux 
galères’—to the galleys—and Dupont composed a lengthy monologue by one 
hypothetical such merchant, who he named ‘Galérien,’ protesting his fate and lauding 
liberty of commerce and the pursuit of self-interest.111 In his inaugural lecture, Beccaria 
had praised Colbert—the enemy of free trade—and traced the history of economics to 
Vauban, Montesquieu, Hume, Genovesi, and a few others, but he left out entirely the 
Physiocrats. This too caught Dupont’s ire.112  
 
For Dupont, Beccaria was threatening and promoted a markedly different brand of 
economics. Instead of opposing commercial regulation to the penal sphere—as the 
Physiocrats had done—Beccaria sought to integrate and harmonize the two: to regulate 
the penal sphere in the image of economic administration; to infuse the penal with that 
logic of regulated competition “which is the most humane sort of war and more worthy of 
reasonable men;”113 to inject the criminal sanction within the economic domain; in sum, 
to simultaneously penalize and economize both fields. Beccaria’s position embraced, at 
its heart, both intense administration and a notion of liberty, which was anathema to 
Dupont. 
 
VI. Foucault’s Beccaria 
 
It is the regulatory dimension of Beccaria’s thought—highlighted by the Physiocrats—
that makes sense, perhaps, of why Beccaria’s writings would become such a pivotal 
aspect of Foucault’s work on the birth of the prison and the emergence of the disciplinary 
form in Discipline and Punish and in his later lectures. Foucault’s fascination for the 
emergence of disciplinary techniques drew his interest both to the police regulations of 
the Parisian markets in the eighteenth century, especially of the Parisian grain markets, 
and to Beccaria’s treatise On Crimes and Punishments.  
109 Ephémérides (1769), vol. 6, 72 n.7.  
110 Ephémérides (1769), vol. 6, 79 n.7.  
111 Ephémérides (1769), vol. 6, 85-90 n.7; Ephémérides du citoyen, ou bibliothèque raisonnée des sciences 
morales et politiques, 1770, Tome Sixième, Dupont de Nemours (ed.) (1770), 51. 
112 Ephémérides (1769), vol. 6, 146-48 n.23.  
113 Beccaria (1995) 8. 
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Regarding the first, Foucault closely associated the concept of discipline to the 
policing of grain markets. In his 1978 lectures at the Collège de France, titled Security, 
Territory Population, Foucault used several different sets of illustrations to help 
demarcate the three different approaches to governing that he identified—the juridical, 
the disciplinary, and the security modes of governmentality—and along those lines, 
Foucault used the policing of the grain markets as the illustration and quintessential 
example of the disciplinary approach.114 Foucault specifically referred to “the example of 
the disciplinary police of grain as it existed until the middle of the eighteenth century, as 
set out in hundreds of pages in Delamare’s Traité de la police’115 to demonstrate how the 
disciplinary mode of governing was centripetal, all-encompassing in its regulatory nature, 
and codifying—as opposed, for instance, to the security apparatus of the Physiocrats. It is 
by means of the police des grains that Foucault shows all three key elements of 
discipline: how it isolates, concentrates, and encloses; how it focuses on the smallest of 
minor details and seeks to eradicate all disorder; how it categorizes into the permissible 
and the prohibited.116 In fact, Foucault even goes so far as to coin the term ‘la police 
disciplinaire des grains’—the ‘disciplinary police of grain’—a qualifier that he alone 
would use to name those policing practices. In other words, Foucault identified the 
precise economic regulatory mechanisms that Beccaria had espoused with his concept of 
discipline—without directly mentioning Beccaria.117 
  
By contrast, Foucault explicitly and repeatedly deployed Beccaria’s name and his 
writings to identify the crucial turning point that would give way to discipline in the 
nineteenth century. Foucault portrayed Beccaria as the leading theoretician of the 
Enlightenment reformers—the first of ‘the “great reformers”’ who would announce ‘all 
those rules that authorize, or rather demand, “lenience”, as a calculated economy of the 
power to punish.’118 As such, Beccaria’s work forms a pivotal moment in Discipline and 
Punish: that moment between the brutal corporal punishments of the seventeenth century 
and the perfection of discipline in the early to mid-nineteenth century. Beccaria stands as 
the key reformer who, drawing on the Enlightenment themes of equality, humanity, 
lenience, autonomy, and universality, as well as utilitarian principles of prevention and 
correction, helped imagine a system of proportional and signifying penalties that would 
communicate the proper values and simultaneously educate the citizenry. By way of 
these reforms, rational punishments were to represent to the citizens, in more muted but 
114 The other sets of illustrations include, for instance, the exclusion of lepers in the Middle Ages as 
evidence of a juridical form of governing, the regulations surrounding the plague at the end of the Middle 
Ages as a reflection of disciplinary mechanisms, and the smallpox inoculation practices from the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries as an illustration of the security apparatuses, see Foucault, Security, Territory, 
Population (2007) 9-10; as well as, the different treatments of urban space, the building of artificial towns, 
and the commercial development of towns during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see ibid. 12-20. 
115 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 45. 
116 Ibid., 45-46. 
117 Foucault returns to this theme at the end of his lectures, arguing perhaps even more forcefully, that the 
eighteenth century regime of policing represents ‘the world of discipline:’ ‘We are in the world of the 
regulation, the world of discipline.’ Ibid., 340; see also ibid. 324-325. 
118 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 101.  
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powerful ways than the brutal punishments, the lessons to be learned and the associations 
to be remembered.  
 
Although Beccaria’s writings do not themselves represent the form of discipline 
per se, paradoxically they sowed the seeds of the disciplinary turn. Foucault emphasized 
that the prison and the disciplinary form do not derive from the logic of the 
Enlightenment reformers—even more, that they are incompatibility with it119—
nevertheless, there are certain aspects of Beccaria’s work that, as portrayed by Foucault, 
reflect a kind of minute regulatory mechanism that is not entirely foreign to the 
disciplinary techniques. ‘The reform of criminal law must be read,’ Foucault emphasized, 
‘as a strategy for the rearrangement of the power to punish, according to modalities that 
render it more regular, more effective, more constant and more detailed in its effects.’120 
Foucault showed that the intervention of the reformers was not so much humanitarian, as 
a project to rehabilitate or refashion an ailing punishment system. The problem was not 
that the brutal punishments of the Ancien régime were too savage, he argued, rather it 
was that they did not function properly anymore—as a result of changing social and 
political circumstances. ‘The criticism of the reformers was directed not so much at the 
weakness or cruelty of those in authority, as at a bad economy of power,’ Foucault 
maintained.121 There was a ‘badly regulated distribution of power’ that resulted in 
‘dysfunction.’122 Foucault argued: 
 
The true objective of the reform movement, even in its most general formulations, 
was not so much to establish a new right to punish based on more equitable 
principles, as to set up a new “economy” of the power to punish, to assure its 
better distribution, so that it should be neither too concentrated at certain 
privileged points, nor too divided between opposing authorities; so that it should 
be distributed in homogenous circuits capable of operating everywhere, in a 
continuous way, down to the finest grain of the social body.123 
 
Instead of representing a challenge or limits to the sovereign’s power to punish, 
according to Foucault, Beccaria’s writings evinced ‘the emergence of a new strategy for 
the exercise of the power to punish’ with the primary objective ‘not to punish less, but to 
punish better,’ with ‘more universality and necessity.’124 
 
This, possibly, is the dark side of Beccaria’s treatise, where leniency is not simply 
the product of an honest desire for more humane punishments, but represents instead a 
more effective, efficient, and persuasive form of social control—where the true goal, as 
Foucault proposed, was ‘to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social 
body.’125 Whether or not this represents something to be criticized, it does capture a final 
119 M. Foucault, La Société punitive. Cours au Collège de France. 1972-1973. B Harcourt (ed.), __ ; 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 114.  
120 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 80. 
121 Ibid. 79. 
122 Ibid. 79 and 80. 
123 Ibid. 80. 
124 Ibid. 81-82.  
125 Ibid. 82.  
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and significant dimension of Beccaria’s work. It is reflected well in the final clause of the 
penultimate paragraph of Beccaria’s treatise: 
 
I conclude with a final reflection that the severity of punishments ought to be 
relative to the state of the nation itself. Stronger and more easily felt impressions 
have to be made on a people only just out of the savage state. A lightening strike 
is needed to stop a fierce lion who is provoked by a gunshot. But as souls become 
softened by society, sensitivity grows. And as it does so, the severity of 
punishments ought to diminish, if the relation between the object and the 
sensation is to remain constant.126  
 
Conclusion 
 
It may be possible, on the basis of the manifold receptions of Beccaria’s treatise, 
to write a history of the foundations of criminal law. The uses, critiques, deployments, 
appropriations, and rereadings of Beccaria’s work constitute an outline of a history of 
criminal law theory, or at least an important series of some of the major interventions in 
the field. In becoming a classic text that has been so widely and varyingly cited, though 
perhaps little read today, On Crimes and Punishments may be used as a mirror on the key 
projects over the past two centuries and a half in the domain of penal law and punishment 
theory—and I hope to have contributed, in a small way, to such an endeavor. In the end, 
we may learn as much about those who have appropriated and used Beccaria than we 
would about Beccaria himself—perhaps more.  
 
126 Beccaria (1995) 113.  
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